There is no need to jam GLONASS. Russian planes are affected using other means--sanctions have cut them off from access to parts and maintenance. It's more impactful because all planes are affected by this, not just those that fly near the border of NATO countries.
I feel like that is mixing separate issues. The sanctions aren't because of the jamming and spoofing. If some other country started foisting the same pollution/sabotage onto its neighbors, those neighbors would still have a problem deciding on how to respond.
The main point is that the bar for someone breaking your navigation system has been lowered. It's not just something you'd expect in a small area or for a short time around an imminent violent confrontation, chronic disruption in a peaceful country is now A Thing That Happens.
That, in turn, changes the engineering considerations for how robust a product needs to be.
The bar has been crossed. Finland and other airlines flying in Northern Europe are suffering from GPS disruptions that make landing at smaller less-equipped airports impossible:
Russians definitely increased their jamming activity after sanctions were imposed. The point I was making is that you do not need to make operation of Russian airplanes more difficult by jamming GPS/GLONASS signals, it is sufficient to deny access to maintenance and parts.
> The point I was making is that you do not need to make operation of Russian airplanes more difficult
I'm saying that "make flights difficult" is kinda-besides-the-point. The real goal is to impose some kind of return-pain to make the offender stop. Poetic symmetry is merely an ideal bonus.
In other words, it may be true that "the ideal retaliation is not very effective because of other circumstances", however that is not the same as "there is no need to retaliate at all."
