I don't think you have refuted my speeding analogy. Do you ever drive in an area with ice on the roads? I recommend that you observe the phenomenon before you dismiss it.
I do not think you have refuted my claim that regulation leads to people suspending critical judgement about risks.
Reserve requirements are a good example of this effect. Industry lobbyists try very hard to have the limit decreased while benefiting from the public perception that the regulator has assured that the bank's assets are sound.
If you don't buy my argument then you probably believe that people are so stupid that without regulation banks would hold $0 in reserves.
The alternative view of humanity is that people are sensible enough to demand sound practices from institutions they deal with on important matters.
My argument is that banks don't use reserves as a way to win customers the way they would if regulators weren't giving an A+ to every bank that holds the minimum :)
One exception is Goldman Sachs. It did not need TARP funds to remain solvent. Yet Treasury forced all banks to accept the funds. What did Goldman do? It immediately paid a huge dividend to its investors.
What happened? Goldman actually had more sound practices than the rest of the industry and was not in danger of failing. It would probably have waited for bankruptcy proceedings and picked through the assets of the other banks, strengthening its already strong balance sheet.
Regulators did not want more money to flow to the firm that had good practices, so it insisted on bailing everyone out. This was to hide information from investors and customers. Goldman angered regulators by paying out the dividend right away, but managed to signal its health.
To understand the point of libertarians on this issue, consider the world in 10 years from today. We might have had a world where chastened investors and customers looked a lot more carefully at the risk management practices of banks before trusting them. Instead, we have a world in which our government owns 30% of all banks and regulators are being hailed as the saviors of the banking industry.
Do you want to live in a world where people act based on reality, or one where taxpayer money is appropriated without congressional approval and given to selected industries, and the appropriators are hailed as heroes that helped the little guy keep his job, prevented another great depression, etc.
It all comes back to the burden that people take upon themselves to assess the riskiness of the decisions they make. Industry loves to have its status quo practices rubber stamped by regulators, to add additional credibility. It all works out well as long as there can be another bailout, etc., but it's not based on reality and represents the slow transfer of wealth from the most productive companies to the ones with the most effective lobbying.
>I don't think you have refuted my speeding analogy.
My point was that you analogy doesn't apply. Pointing to ice on the roads is completely missing the point: that the analogy doesn't hold in the first place.
>I do not think you have refuted my claim that regulation leads to people suspending critical judgement about risks.
I did not say this! I said that specifying a reserve requirement does not reduce bank reserves. Please keep this argument to reserve requirements, not general regulation.
>If you don't buy my argument then you probably believe that people are so stupid that without regulation banks would hold $0 in reserves.
The UK does not have reserve requirements and they don't have zero reserves. But they did not raise their reserves to safe levels either, refuting your original point.
Incidentally, it's you that's arguing that regulation encourages banks to hold lower reserves than they would without reserve requirements. You are constantly conflating reserve requirements and general regulation, moving an argument about one to a conclusion about the other.
You then go on to talk about TARP again, illustrating my point.
The ice on the roads creates a risk of the car going out of control. Unanticipated volatility in the market creates the risk of a bank being insolvent.
To manage the risk of your car going out of control, you choose a safe speed.
To manage the risk of a bank becoming insolvent, it chooses an amount of capital to keep in reserve.
I seriously doubt you take exception with any aspect of the analogy so far...
A speed limit sign suggests a speed that is safe to drive. However like any regulation it is only an imperfect estimate. Yet people seem to drive at that speed under adverse weather conditions completely irrationally.
A reserve requirement suggests an amount of reserve capital that is safe for operation of a bank. However like any regulation it is an imperfect estimate. Few banks carry reserves in excess of those set by the requirement.
These are completely identical scenarios. In each case, humans cluster around the regulation without exercising independent judgment. Drivers slide off of the road all the time, and a bit of recent price volatility sent many banks into insolvency.
Your example about the UK is noteworthy but I would argue that due to the dominance of US banks (and US regulations) in financial markets, UK banks are inclined to mirror US policies in order to remain competitive with US banks. Analogously, a Russian firm may adopt some US accounting practices if it wishes to attract investment from the US.
There are two factors: The first is the way that the bar is set by the regulation in the first place. T
he second is the grouping/incentive effect. If your competitor has too few reserves then you are at a disadvantage for not copying that behavior unless the economy crashes (such that your competitor goes out of business and you don't).
>A reserve requirement suggests an amount of reserve capital that is safe for operation of a bank.
In one case we have members of the public who have passed a driving test. In the other, we have the foremost experts in the field, using the latest theories of risk, working with millions of dollars of modelling and statistical equipment, with their jobs on the line. For what good reason would a single one of them look at the reserve rate and say "Although the government doesn't claim that this is a safe rate for banks to operate at, but instead sets it completely arbitrarily, and admits to the fact that it's totally arbitrary, and has not changed this rate in several decades because it is an obsolete tool of monetary policy, I am nevertheless going to take it to 'suggest' a safe level of reserves, totally ignore all of my models and education, and just pick that number on a completely irrational basis."
That just makes my point even better. Experts set safe speed limits for non-experts to follow. Minimum reserves are set arbitrarily and experts that decide actual reserve levels will not pay them any attention.
risk compensation is an effect whereby individual people may tend to adjust their behaviour in response to perceived changes in risk. It is seen as self-evident that individuals will tend to behave in a more cautious manner if their perception of risk or danger increases. Another way of stating this is that individuals will behave less cautiously in situations where they feel "safer" or more protected.
Mirrlees also did highly theoretical work on another incentive problem: “moral hazard.” As is well known to those who study insurance, insurance coverage gives the beneficiary an incentive to take more risks than would be optimal. This is called “moral hazard.” Mirrlees’s insight, based on a complex mathematical model, is that the problem can be solved with an optimal combination of carrots and sticks. Insurance payments are essentially a carrot. But “sticks” could be designed also, so that an insured person who takes risks pays a penalty for doing so. With this combination of carrots and sticks, the insured person acts almost as if he is uninsured, and the insurer acts almost as if he were the insured.
I do not think you have refuted my claim that regulation leads to people suspending critical judgement about risks.
Reserve requirements are a good example of this effect. Industry lobbyists try very hard to have the limit decreased while benefiting from the public perception that the regulator has assured that the bank's assets are sound.
If you don't buy my argument then you probably believe that people are so stupid that without regulation banks would hold $0 in reserves.
The alternative view of humanity is that people are sensible enough to demand sound practices from institutions they deal with on important matters.
My argument is that banks don't use reserves as a way to win customers the way they would if regulators weren't giving an A+ to every bank that holds the minimum :)
One exception is Goldman Sachs. It did not need TARP funds to remain solvent. Yet Treasury forced all banks to accept the funds. What did Goldman do? It immediately paid a huge dividend to its investors.
What happened? Goldman actually had more sound practices than the rest of the industry and was not in danger of failing. It would probably have waited for bankruptcy proceedings and picked through the assets of the other banks, strengthening its already strong balance sheet.
Regulators did not want more money to flow to the firm that had good practices, so it insisted on bailing everyone out. This was to hide information from investors and customers. Goldman angered regulators by paying out the dividend right away, but managed to signal its health.
To understand the point of libertarians on this issue, consider the world in 10 years from today. We might have had a world where chastened investors and customers looked a lot more carefully at the risk management practices of banks before trusting them. Instead, we have a world in which our government owns 30% of all banks and regulators are being hailed as the saviors of the banking industry.
Do you want to live in a world where people act based on reality, or one where taxpayer money is appropriated without congressional approval and given to selected industries, and the appropriators are hailed as heroes that helped the little guy keep his job, prevented another great depression, etc.
It all comes back to the burden that people take upon themselves to assess the riskiness of the decisions they make. Industry loves to have its status quo practices rubber stamped by regulators, to add additional credibility. It all works out well as long as there can be another bailout, etc., but it's not based on reality and represents the slow transfer of wealth from the most productive companies to the ones with the most effective lobbying.