I'm not talking about randomness (in fact, I specifically excluded that). Anyway, it's not really meaningful to speak of a process having control over itself -- it is itself.
Free will either is defined in such a way that mind must transcend physics to have it, or it's defined in a way that is meaningful inside the laws of physics. I have nothing to say about the first definition, but given that most here would agree that minds are constrained by physics, any remaining question about free will must refer to whether we can predict the actions of an agent, and since it's obvious that we can if we have a sufficiently detailed simulation of the agent, the only definition in which "free will" is still a useful concept that meshes with our intuitive understanding of self-determination is the one I mention in my earlier comment.
Free will either is defined in such a way that mind must transcend physics to have it, or it's defined in a way that is meaningful inside the laws of physics. I have nothing to say about the first definition, but given that most here would agree that minds are constrained by physics, any remaining question about free will must refer to whether we can predict the actions of an agent, and since it's obvious that we can if we have a sufficiently detailed simulation of the agent, the only definition in which "free will" is still a useful concept that meshes with our intuitive understanding of self-determination is the one I mention in my earlier comment.