> run more exit nodes (which are depereately needed -- about 1k nodes for 2M users)
What is the ideal ratio of exit nodes to users? It seems that too close to 1:1 is going to be almost as bad as too few nodes, at least to my (not particularly well versed in Tor infrastructure) thinking.
Thats a difficult question I'm not qualified to answer, and in hindsight that statistic was confusing. The real issue with the tiny amount of exit nodes in operation is a fundamental weakness in Tor; if an attacker can run a large enough percentage of Tor nodes (not necessarily just exit nodes), they can use traffic confirmation attacks to deanonymize users.
What is the ideal ratio of exit nodes to users? It seems that too close to 1:1 is going to be almost as bad as too few nodes, at least to my (not particularly well versed in Tor infrastructure) thinking.