I think it's unfortunate that the page mentions that Dissent protects groups against Sybils and sockpuppets. I too spend lots of time going trough these papers looking up what the algorithm was. Dissent clearly does not even try to solve Sybil/sockpuppet problem.
1. Anonymity is provided as long as there is a single trustworthy member, regardless of how many phony members there are.
2. Denial-of-service resistance is provided even against many Sybils - eventually they will all be kicked out of the group and communication can proceed.
This is in contrast to protocols (e.g. onion routing, Aqua[0]) that only provide their security properties when the adversary doesn't control too much of the system. I think it is a fair claim to make and in particular is clear to people familiar with this area of research.
You seem to be outsourcing the trust mechanism to the users, while the page implies that you've solved the trust problem internally through the protocol.
Don't get me wrong, the research is very impressive in it's own right, but that's at best misleading.
What is the mechanism to kick Sybils out of the group, though? How is it ensured that enough sockpuppets don't try to kick trustworthy groups out? I am not following the mechanisms here.
