1. Anonymity is provided as long as there is a single trustworthy member, regardless of how many phony members there are.
2. Denial-of-service resistance is provided even against many Sybils - eventually they will all be kicked out of the group and communication can proceed.
This is in contrast to protocols (e.g. onion routing, Aqua[0]) that only provide their security properties when the adversary doesn't control too much of the system. I think it is a fair claim to make and in particular is clear to people familiar with this area of research.
You seem to be outsourcing the trust mechanism to the users, while the page implies that you've solved the trust problem internally through the protocol.
Don't get me wrong, the research is very impressive in it's own right, but that's at best misleading.
What is the mechanism to kick Sybils out of the group, though? How is it ensured that enough sockpuppets don't try to kick trustworthy groups out? I am not following the mechanisms here.
1. Anonymity is provided as long as there is a single trustworthy member, regardless of how many phony members there are.
2. Denial-of-service resistance is provided even against many Sybils - eventually they will all be kicked out of the group and communication can proceed.
This is in contrast to protocols (e.g. onion routing, Aqua[0]) that only provide their security properties when the adversary doesn't control too much of the system. I think it is a fair claim to make and in particular is clear to people familiar with this area of research.
[0] "Towards Efficient Traffic-analysis Resistant Anonymity Networks" <http://www.mpi-sws.org/~stevens/pubs/sigcomm13.pdf>